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RICO: The Controversial
Congressional Definition
of "Racketeer"
by R. Delacy Peters, Jr.

W

hen people think of racketeers
they tend to think of persons
involved in an organized illegal
activity such as murder, arson, bribery, or
extortion. An imaginative person might
conjure up clandestine schemes such as
white slave trafficking or smuggling contraband cigarettes. But since the early
1980's the list of persons being labeled
racketeers does not include so much the
average Al Capone and John Dillinger
types, or criminal cartels and "Mafia" organizations. In stark contrast, prominent
and respected accountants, I attorneys, 2investment bankers3 and other professionals
are being charged with "racketeering activity." 4 Rather than La Cosa Nostra or the
Black Hand, the list of "racketeering enterprises" 5 defending suits under the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) 6 is made up of
highly reputable businesses like Deloitte
Haskins & Sells, Lloyd's of London and
ShearsonlAmerican Express. 7
RICO was passed by Congress in 1970.
The principle purpose of the statute was to
halt and prevent the "infiltration of organized crime and racketeering into legitimate commerce." 9 Congress felt it could
effectively fight organized crime by stripping the "Mafia" of the profits it derived
from infiltrating legitimate businesses. 9
For many years "gangsters" have controlled legitimate businesses using their
racketeering reputation and skills to earn
high rates of return on their investment of
time and capital. 10 A racketeer might acquire an interest in a legitimate business
for many reasons. Generally racketeers
seek to diversify their activities and increase their assets using legitimate enterprises to launder their money and protect
their wealth.
The economic principals of the criminal
enterprises are sound, although the meth26- The Law Forum/Fal' 1986

ods suggest a few antitrust violation issues.
In some instances they would create monopolies, at other times cartels, or the
racketeers would simply make the legitimate entrepreneurs in a particular industry an offer they could not refuse. RICO
armed the government with new and controversiallegal avenues to pursue criminal
and civil convictions for this type of illegal
activity.
However, today when this "four letter"
acronym is invoked in litigation it introduces a staggering level of anxiety into the
highest courts, the largest law firms and
the most prestigious boardrooms in the
country. The big business anxiety levels
are not as a result of ties or links to organized crime and criminal activity, but
rather are related to the civil remedies.
Section 1964(c) of the Act provides civil
remedies, separate and distinct from the
criminal remedies under RICO, for individuals injured in their businesses. 11 To
invoke the civil provisions of the RICO
statute, a plaintiff must allege that the
(1) person (2) employed by or associated
with an enterprise engaging in interstate
commerce (3) conducts or participates in
the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise
(4) through a pattern (5) of racketeering activity.12 The definition of "racketeering
activity" under the statute includes not
only murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson and numerous other crimes, but also,
mail fraud and wire fraud. 13 Furthermore,
a "pattern of racketeering activity" is defined as two or more acts of racketeering
activity committed within ten years of
each other. 14 If an individual is successful
in a civil RICO suit, that individual may
recover treble damages and the cost of the
suit, including reasonable attorneys fees. 15
Many RICO commentators feel this type
of recovery, not normally available in similar causes of action, represented "the

dangling carrot" that sparked most of the
controversial litigation in areas far afield
from the perceived domain of the racketeer.
What essentially has happened is that
"garden variety type" 16 business disputes
have been converted to RICO claims by alleging two or more counts of mail and/or
wire fraud. The scope of mail and wire
fraud is so broad that literally any commercial business transaction may fall into this
dubious category. All that need be alleged
is the use of the mails or telephones to execute or further a scheme to defraudY
The defendant does not even have to actually mail or wire anything ifit is foreseeable that mailing or wiring may be used. IS
Additionally, the "fraudulent scheme" does
not have to involve money or property, but
need only be a departure from the ever elusive "good faith business dealings" standard - "a departure from 'fundamental honesty' or 'fair play and candid dealings. '" 19
A 1985 American Bar Association study
on civil RICO actions reported that the
predicate acts of mail and wire fraud accounted for approximately seventy-five
percent of all the civil RICO actions pending at that time. 20 Many studies as well as
the courts have recognized the potential
for abuse under the mail and wire fraud
provision of the statute. 21 On the other
hand, as was stated by the Second Circuit
in Furman v. Cim to,22 "[fJraud is fraud,
whether it is committed by a hit man for
organized crime or by the president of a
Wall Street brokerage firmo"23
Supporters of the civil RICO provisions
say consumers are often legally impotent
victims of increasing business fraud and
bad faith dealingso 24 Consumer groups applaud the opportunity to turn a civil cause
of action that was traditionally an uphill
battle at the state level into a powerful federal case under RICO.25 Critics of RICO
say disappointed or an~ered clientele, and
O

jealous or unscrupulous competitors are
the civil RICO plaintiffs. 26 There seems to
be a thinning line of demarcation between
"good ole" business practices of closing a
"sweet deal" or driving a hard bargain and
claims of fraud, misrepresentation, and
manipulation under RICO.
Corporate officers worry that the normal
activities of a successful enterprise-increased earnings and expansion through
smooth sales representatives, enthusiastic
brokers, polished marketers and active acquisition departments-can bring RICO
litigation down on an unsuspecting business without justification. Public interest
groups argue that the only way to cease
fraudulent business activities is to present
big business with the threat of treble damages under a civil RICO suit. 27
The business community criticizes RICO
arguing that a civil conviction carries the
criminal stigma of a conviction for "racketeering, " thereby causing prudent business
persons defending such suits to settle a
case with no merit to avoid this stigma or
ruinous media exposure. 28 Ironically, the
RICO plaintiff is said to have extortive
purposes of simply wrestling large in terrorem settlements out of the deepest pockets they can find. 29
The business community claims the label
of racketeer raises many questions and
poses significant problems for business. 30
One issue that concerns the business community is whether the government would
use this label of "racketeer" as a basis for
surveillance or to set up information gathering grand jury investigations. There is
also concern that corporate officers and
principals of particular industries would
be branded with the label of "racketeers."
Another issue is whether legitimate business people would wish to avoid acquiring
an unsavory reputation that might come
from being associated with an industry
tainted by "racketeering activity." 31 CEO's
suggest that the label racketeer hampers a
company's ability to carry on business, in
that it creates a lack of desire for financial
institutions, accounting and law firms to
extend their services for fear of doing business with wrongdoers. 32
On the other hand, consumer groups
argue that business fraud is rampant and
" ... civil RICO is an 'indispensable co~
sumer protection statute,' " providing "relief from financial muggings and white
collar criminals." 33 Public interest groups
and state and federal prosecutors point out
that, " [l]ack of vigorous enforcement against
'white collar' crime shakes the public's
faith in the efficacy and fairness of our
criminal justice system." 34 Robert Blakey,
a Notre Dame law professor and Chief
Counsel to the Senate Subcommittee that

proposed RICO, noted that "the business
community criticized the Securities Act of
1933 and the antitrust laws, charging that
the statutes would halt capital formation,
prolong the Depression, and ruin business,
in much the same way it now criticizes
RICO." 35
The recent wave of civil RICO suits
started in 1980. Of the cases decided before 1985, three percent were decided between 1970 and 1980. Conversely, two
percent were decided in 1980, seven percent in 1981, thirteen percent in 1982,
thirty-three percent in 1983, and fortythree percent in 1984.36 By 1984 civil
RICO suits had been filed in nearly every
area of the law, including securities law,
both sides oflabor union disputes, class ac·
tion torts, and even domestic disputesY
The ABA RICO Report revealed that
out of 270 cases, twenty had been filed
against attorneys and accountants, with
another forty cases concerning securities
brokers. The ABA RICO Report also noted
that of the 270 cases, forty percent involved
securities fraud and thirty-seven percent
common law fraud in a commercial or
business setting. 38
Attorneys have been named as defendants
in RICO litigation primarily for rendering
routine professional advice in stock transactions or partnership offerings. 39 Some
people believe it is aggressive plaintiff attorneys searching out new causes of action
who are responsible for this onslaught of
civil RICO claims. Senator Strom Thurmond, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee stated, "[RICO has been] ...
perverted by fertile legal minds." While
this writer would not hold plaintiff attorneys totally responsible, they have been
under fire and many judges have not exactly welcomed the RICO plaintiff's creativity.
A number of judges have recognized the
potential for abuse apparent within the
statute. As a result courts have begun to
judicially constrict the RICO provisions.
Some courts read into the statute that the
plaintiff must allege a separate and distinct
"racketeering injury" aside from one of the
predicate acts enumerated under the statute. 40 Other courts required that the defendant must have been convicted of a
previous RICO violation. 41 Still other
courts have held that neither the previous
conviction or separate injury were requirements. 42 The inconsistent holdings created serious difficulties for defense attorneys trying to advise their clients on
how to avoid or respond to civil RICO
litigation.
The Litigation Section of the American
Bar Association and the Corporation and
Business Section combined their resources

polling their memberships ofabout 100,000,
seeking the opinions of RICO litigators on
the expansion of the field and any legislative changes that should be sought. 43 The
Bureau of National Affairs (BNA) began
to publish a Civil RICO Reporter; Commerce Clearing House (CCH) published a
RICO Business Disputes Guide; and the
U.S. Department of Justice published a
RICO manual for federal prosecutors.
In the midst of the confusion and controversy surrounding RICO and the split
among the United States courts of appeals,
the Supreme Court stepped in. The U.S.
Supreme Court endorsed the civil RICO
cause of action with its holding in Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex CO.44 Sedima was decided by the Court to resolve conflicting
decisions among the courts of appeals and
to clarify the congressional intent of RICO.
Sedima, a Belgian corporation, had entered into a joint venture with Imrex, an
American corporation. Sedima took orders
from Belgian companies for electronic
components. Imrex would then obtain the
components in America and ship them to
Sedima in Europe. The two companies
agreed to split the profits. As the venture
proceeded Sedima became convinced that
Imrex was presenting inflated bills and
declaring nonexistent expenses, thus siphoning off the profits. Sedima filed suit
in New York, alleging breach of contract,
unjust enrichment and RICO violations
based on mail and wire fraud.
The district court dismissed Sedima's
RICO claims for failure to allege a distinct
"racketeering type injury." The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed
based on the failure to allege a "racketeering injury," and additionally, found the
complaint defective for not alleging that
the defendants had already been convicted
of a RICO violation. 45
In a 5-4 ruling, the Supreme Court held
that: "(1) there is no requirement that a
plaintiff in a private action establish a
"racketeering injury", as opposed to an injury resulting from the predicate acts of
the statute; and (2) there is no requirement
that a private action can proceed only
against a defendant who has already been
convicted of a predicate act or of a RICO
violation." 46 The Court was not impressed
by the concern that "legitimate" persons
and businesses were being attacked under
the statute. 47
After determining Congress intended to
reach "legitimate" and "illegitimate" enterprises when it passed RICO, Justice White
said, "[legitimate businesses] ... enjoy
neither an inherent incapacity for criminal
activity nor immunity from its consequences." 48 Justice White stated further,
Fal~
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It is true that private civil actions under the statute are being brought almost solely against such defendants,
rather than against archetypal, intimidating mobster. Yet this defect - if defect it is-is inherent in the statute as
written, and its correction must lie
with Congress. It is not for the judiciary to eliminate the private action in
situations where Congress has provided it .... 49

had a purpose of increasing the Attorney
General's ability to prosecute large scale
criminals. It would have given the state the
ability to seize all profits from activity defined as "racketeering" under the law. 58
Under the proposed bill, a pattern of racketeering would have been established by at
least two occurrences of racketeering that
have the same or similar circumstances
within a five year period. 59 The Maryland
proposal actually broadened the civil side
of the statute hoping to restore any lost
consumer and investor confidence as a result of the impact of the savings and loan
crisis. 60
The Maryland House Judiciary Committee thought the Maryland RICO bill
was too broad and encompassing. 61 The

The Supreme Court accepted the idea
that Congress had created a "Frankenstein"
in civil RICO saying "... RICO is evolving into something quite different from
the original conception of its enactors." 50
The Court also charted a new course for the
lower courts to take, suggesting that the appropriate judicial action is the development
ofa "... meaningful concept of pattern." 51
In Sedima's famous "footnote 14" the Court
acknowledged that "the definition of a 'pattern of racketeering activity' differs from
other provisions in section 1961 in that it
states that a pattern 'requires at least two
acts of racketeering activity.' "52 The Court
then implied that the two acts necessary to
satisfy the statute may not be sufficient by
stating "... in common parlance two ofanything do not generally form a 'pattern.' "53
The distinct message from the Supreme
Court, as per footnote fourteen, is "[t]he .
legislative history supports the view that
two isolated acts of racketeering activity do
not constitute a pattern." 54 Many of the
legitimate businesses caught in the RICO
web have been subject to pleadings that
cite two isolated acts of racketeering stemming from one event or transaction. 55
With the holding in Sedima, the RICO defense counsel can use the pattern requirement as a new battleground.
While Congress has yet to act and the
courts, after Sedima, are now beginning a
committee declined the invitation from
slow process of adding judicial gloss to
Maryland RICO sponsors to use the bill as
RICO, many states have taken it upon
a menu and choose the provisions it apthemselves to pass state RICO statutes.
proved of. Instead the committee killed
These state statutes, twenty-four to date,
the RICO bill and declared that the comvary immensely in scope and applicability.
Some' of the statutes have eliminated a primittee would review the sections of the
vate right of action while others have added Maryland code that deal with forfeiture
provisions to develop a bill that served the
provisions for injunctive relief and punitive
same purpose. 62
damages. The states that have enacted
The sponsors of the Maryland RICO
RICO statutes are Arizona, California,
bill, that was modeled after federal RICO,
Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia,
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Louisihad hoped that the committee would
amend and revise the bill to conform to
ana, Mississippi, Nevada, New Jersey,
New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, OreMaryland's needs. However this task is
gon, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, Rhode Iseasier said than done. Aside from the atland, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin. 56
tractive remedies and broad categories of
A RICO bill was introduced in the Maryactivities prohibited, the federal RICO
land House of Delegates in January 1986,
statute is laden with ambiguities. The
most glaring ambiguities concern the probut was killed by the Maryland House Jucedural issues presented within the statute.
diciary Committee. 57 The proposed bill
28-The Law ForumJFal~ 1986

The Maryland
proposal actually
broadened the civil
side of the statute
hoping to restore
any lost consumer
and investor
confidence . . .

With respect to personal jurisidiction,
section 1965 of the Act allows nationwide
service of process wherever the person
"resides, is found, has an agent, or transacts his affairs." 63 Some courts have held
that with nationwide service of process,
due process for the defendant requires
only that a defendant have minimum contacts with the United States. 64 Conversely,
some courts have held the RICO provision
to mean due process for the defendant requires minimum contacts with the forum
state. 65
Section 1965(b) provides a "co-conspiracy" theory of venue, allowing assertion of venue over "other parties" if venue
is already established over at least one defendant. This section has been used by
courts to serve and join parties over whom
venue would ordinarily be improper, if
" ... the ends of justice so require ... ."66
For actions brought by the United States,
section 1965(c) allows witnesses to be
served with subpoenas in any judicial
district.
For criminal violations of RICO the
burden of proof is beyond a reasonable
doubt. 67 However, the civil RICO claim
raises a question as to whether the ordinary
civil burden of proof, a preponderance
of the evidence, standard applies. Most
courts have followed the preponderance of
the evidence standard, but the ABA and
others have suggested that in light of the
heavy penalties for civil violations a higher
burden of proof should be applicable. 68
The alternatives suggested by the ABA are
adopting a beyond a reasonable doubt or
clear and convincing evidence standard. 69
In dicta, the Supreme Court in Sedima indicated a "preponderance standard" seemed
proper. 70
RICO provides a five year statute oflimitations on the criminal side, but there is
no statute of limitations for civil actions
provided in RICO. Courts have applied
several approaches toward determining
whether a civil RICO claim should be
barred by the statute oflimitations. Most
courts look to the most closely analogous
state statute of limitations with respect- to
the offense involved. 71 However, choice of
law questions, concerning which state law
to supply still cloud the issue. Other courts
look to the pseudo statute oflimitations in
section 1961(5) that requires two acts of
racketeering activity, " ... one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of which occurred within
ten years . . . after the commission of a
prior act of racketeering activity." 72
Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure has been called the RICO plaintiff's pitfall. Strict interpretations of the
rule have put the burden on the plaintiff

to plead with particularity alleging time,
place, specific content of fraud, the identity of persons making alleged misrepresentations and the consequences of the
scheme. Some courts have given a more
liberal construction to Rule 9(b).73 An
Illinois district court held a skeleton RICO
complaint as sufficient that pleaded " ... the
bare bones of the fraudulent scheme...." 74
The Illinois court also noted that the
amended complaint ''will never be accepted as a model pleading" under RICO. 75
As far as discovery goes, one court noted
"[a]mong other things, a defendant may be
exposed to pretrial discovery of every aspect of its business for a ten-year period." 76
Another consideration under RICO is
collateral estoppel. A defendant in a criminal or administrative action must consider
the legal effect of a judgment or settlement
of those claims on subsequent civil RICO
claims. Pursuant to section 1964(d) a final
RICO judgment or decree in favor of the
U.S. in a criminal proceeding " ... shall
estop the defendant from denying the essential allegations of the criminal offense
in any subsequent civil proceeding brought
by the United States."77 It is likely that
where a successful government action is
followed by a private RICO claim, the unsuccessful defendant will be subject to an
offensive use of collateral estoppel. Thus,
a defendant may be barred from relitigating the same issue in the private action. 78
Collateral estoppel has been used defensively in RICO cases as well. Previous civil
litigation has precluded relitigation of issues in a RICO case where an investor's
RICO claim failed because it involved the
same transactions and issues of fraud involved in a previous securities fraud claim
that had been adjudicated adversely to the
claimant. 79
There are other questions not resolved
under RICO pertaining to equitable relief
and arbitration. Section 1964(a) gives federal courts the authority to grant equitable
relief, but Congress was silent with respect
to private actions.8o Section 1964(b) categorically empowers the Attorney General
with the ability to obtain injunctive relief,
but again Congress made no reference to
private plaintiffs. 81
There have been split decisions in RICO
cases concerning securities and commodities fraud where there are arbitration
clauses present in the contracts involved. 82
The recent judicial trend is to rule that
RICO cases are arbitrable. In jurisdictions
where the RICO cases are not arbitrable,
courts are tending to stay litigation of the
non-arbitrable claims for reasons of judicial
economy pending the arbitration of the
other claims that were asserted. In earlier
decisions the courts reasoned that RICO

claims could not be arbitrated because of
the important federal interest in enforcing
RICO.83
Congress is well aware that it is time for
a change in RICO. There are currently
several bills in the House and Senate. 84
The bills address a myriad of subjects including, requiring a prior criminal conviction of a predicate act, modifying the predicate acts requirement relating to mail and
wire fraud, adding penalties for frivolous
RICO claims, defining "pattern" more
precisely, redefining "enterprise", adding
a new substantive offense relating to organizing, financing, controlling or partici·
pating in a "criminal syndicate", changing
the name of the act, providing a statute of
limitations, applying a higher standard for
burden of proof in civil actions, and providing equitable relief in private civil
actions. 85
Support for amendments to civil RICO
has come from, inter alia, the ABA, the
criminal defense bar, accountants, bankers, securities professionals, the Securities
and Exchange Commission, the SenateJudiciary Committee, insurance companies
and other businessmen. The opposition
has been led by state attorney generals,
public interest groups, district attorneys,
state securities administrators, the FDIC,
some of the original proponents of the bill,
and until recently the Justice Department.
As this article was being written the J ustice Department reversed their position on
RICO. Although the Justice Department
was originally opposed to any amendments
to the statute, their new position is in favor
of amending the statute. 86
At the request of Congressman John
Conyers (D-Mich), Chairman of the House
Judiciary Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, business coalitions and public interest
groups held meetings and attended hearings in an effort to reach a compromise. As
this article goes to press the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Criminal Justice
passed a compromise bill that would
amend RICO.s7
The bill would change the name of the
statute from "RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS ACT" to "PATTERN OF
ILLICIT ACTIVITY ACT". The terms
"illicit" or "criminal" would be substituted
in provisions of the act where "racketeering" now appears. Section 1964(c) which
currently provides for a civil action with
recovery of treble damages and the cost of
the suit, including reasonable attorney's
fee for any violation of section 1962 would
be subject to the most changes.
The new section 1964(c) would have six
provisions. Subsection (1) would only alIowa civil action against an individual who

knowingly violates section 1962 and limit
the recovery to actual damages. Subsection (2) would allow the federal and state
governments or any agency or corporation
thereof to bring a civil action against an individual who knowingly violates section
1962 and recover treble damages for the
injury the government sustained. Subsection (3) pertains to corporations, and provides corporate liability if an officer, director, partner, or employee knowingly
violates the statute within the scope of his
duties and was authorized by an executive
officer or ratified by the governing board
of the corporation. Furthermore, the conduct in violation of the statute must have
been intended to benefit and did benefit
the corporation materially. Subsection (4)
provides a three year statute oflimitations.
Subsection (5) addresses actions alleging a
predicate act based on fraud, providing
that the plaintiff must establish the existence offraud by clear and convincing evidence. Finally, subsection (6) instructs the
court to award a prevailing plaintiff a reasonable attorney's fee. 88 The proposed
legislation is still far from adoption and
therefore the current civil RICO provisions, with the endorsement of the Supreme Court, prevail.
In this writer's opinion the current civil
RICO provisions must be changed. Legitimate businesses were not the intended
subjects of civil RICO prosecution and
should accordingly be absent from the defense tables in civil RICO litigation. I realize that by proffering this position proponents of civil RICO, who would uphold
the current provisions, might consider me
a cold and callous individual, who would
cavalierly disregard the rights of victimized
consumers in the furtherance of the interests and profits of white collar criminals.
However, the majority of legitimate businesses prosecuted under RICO are just
that -legitimate businesses, not white collar criminals. Furthermore, victimized
consumers have many remedies in the
courtroom without resort to civil RICO. I
agree with Justice Marshall's dissent in
Sedima, where he declared, in light of the
fact that" [0]nly 9% ofall civil RICO cases
have involved allegations of criminal activity normally associated with professional criminals .... The central purpose
that Congress sought to promote through
civil RICO is now a mere footnote." 89
Ironically, as Congress contemplates
changes to civil RICO provisions federal
prosecutors in New York are beginning
two of the most significant trials in the history of organized crime in the United
States. In 1985 the Justice Department
handed down an unprecedented series of
indictments affecting seventeen of the
Fal~ 1986rrhe Law Forum--29

twenty-four Mafia families in the U.S.90
The Justice Department is pursuing its
cases against the five New York crime
families under the criminal provisions of
RICO. Justice Department officials confess to using the civil provisions of RICO
only ten times against organized crime
figures, but vow to follow up recent convictions with private civil suits. 91
In Sedima, Justice Marshall's dissent described the majority's interpretation of the
civil RICO provisions as revolutionizing
private litigation, saying " ... [the Court]
validates the federalization of broad areas
of state common law of frauds, and it approves the displacement of well established federal remedial provisions." 92
This writer feels that the civil RICO provisions have revolutionized private litigation, not as a result of the Supreme Court's
holding in Sedima, but rather a result of
the enactment of RICO in 1970.
The underlying purpose of the civil
RICO provisions was to strip the Mafia of
its profits and to stop organized crime
from infiltrating legitimate businesses. 93
The Mafia earned at least 26 billion in
1985 and today literally controls many
unions and labor intensive industries such
as building construction, restaurants, transportation, and clothing. 94 Time magazine
published figures estimating that "[o]ut of
a formal oath - taking national Mafia membership of some 1,700, at least half belong
to the five New York clans, each of which
is larger and more effective than those in
any other city."95
To this writer it seems the civil RICO
plaintiff with a fully equipped arsenal of
treble damages, criminal stigma, media exposure and recovery of attorneys fees is
waging war in New York. However the
battles are not being fought in Mafia territory, at the loading docks on the waterfront
or in the garment district or at unfinished
construction sites, instead somehow the
civil RICO plaintiff missed the target completely and ended up on Wall Street.
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